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In support of the Boundary Layer Transition Flight Experiment (BLT FE) Project, a 
manufactured protuberance tile was installed on the port wing of Space Shuttle Orbiter Discovery 
for STS-119, STS-128, STS-131 and STS-133 as well as Space Shuttle Endeavour for STS-134. 
Additional instrumentation was installed in order to obtain more spatially resolved measurements 
downstream of the protuberance. This paper provides an overview of the BLT FE Project with 
emphasis on the STS-131 and STS-133 results. A high-level overview of the in-situ flight data is 
presented, along with a summary of the comparisons between pre- and post-flight analysis 
predictions and flight data. Comparisons show that empirically correlated predictions for boundary 
layer transition onset time closely match the flight data, while predicted surface temperatures 
were significantly higher than observed flight temperatures. A thermocouple anomaly observed 
on a number of the missions is discussed as are a number of the mitigation actions that will be 
taken on the final flight, STS-134, including potential alterations of the flight trajectory and 
changes to the flight instrumentation. 
 
Symbols 
BFCFD Heating augmentation (“bump”) factor predicted by CFD, dimensionless 
k  Adjustment (“knockdown”) factor, dimensionless 
Me  Mach number at the edge of the boundary layer, dimensionless 
Re θ Reynolds number based on momentum thickness, dimensionless 
q   Heat flux, Btu/ft2-sec 
0002XFq  Heat flux prediction provided by XF0002, Btu/ft2-sec 
σ  Standard deviation 
 
Introduction 
The amount of thermal protection system (TPS) required for a safe and successful entry is 
one of the major driving factors in the design and weight of any vehicle entering a planetary 
atmosphere. The time during the entry at which the boundary layer transitions from laminar to 
turbulent flow is a major factor in the TPS sizing. The study of boundary layer transition (BLT) has 
been a significant effort for many decades, but the specific physics-based mechanisms that 
cause hypersonic BLT are poorly understood. This lack of understanding hinders designers in 
making accurate predictions of when the boundary layer will become turbulent and affects the 
sizing and the understanding of TPS robustness. If the geometry of a vehicle is known, engineers 
can obtain ground-test data from wind tunnels to develop engineering correlations1-4. However, 
one of the major weaknesses in a ground-based correlation approach is lack of understanding of 
the differences between wind tunnel and flight environments and how those differences affect 
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BLT. In addition to the difficulties in predicting the onset of BLT, hypersonic turbulent heating 
predictions have also proven to be very challenging in many cases. Very little data exists to verify 
turbulent heating prediction models at low Reynolds numbers and hypersonic conditions.  
Following STS-107, the Orbiter Damage Assessment Team (DAT) was established with a 
charter to assess the effects of ascent and on-orbit damage and impacts upon the ability to 
perform safe re-entry5. A substantial testing and analytical tool development activity was 
undertaken to characterize the aeroheating, thermal, and stress implications of damage on the 
Orbiter temperatures, tile factors of safety, and structural margins. The more notable aeroheating 
tools developed included the BLT Tool3, 5-7 and the Cavity Heating Tool5,8,9,10. In addition, the 
ability to rapidly produce Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulations of damage scenarios 
was also developed11, 12. Many of these capabilities are now also being utilized in support of the 
NASA Orion/Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle effort (MPCV). 
During STS-11413, an unprecedented repair spacewalk was performed to remove two 
protruding gap fillers because the risks associated with the uncertainties in early BLT predictions 
and resulting heating effects were determined to be higher than the risks for spacewalk itself. As 
a result of these uncertainties with BLT and turbulent heating predictions, a flight test using a 
protuberance on the Orbiter to purposefully trip the boundary layer at a prescribed Mach number 
was proposed in November 200614. The flight experiment was ultimately approved and funded by 
the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). In 
addition, The NASA Fundamental Aeronautics Program Hypersonics Project has sponsored a 
number of research efforts in part motivated by this flight experiment activity1,6,15,16,17.  
Many motivations exist5 to obtain flight test data of this kind including a strong desire to obtain 
data to improve modeling capabilities and increase the potential for physics-based understanding. 
Although early proposals included installing experiment hardware on all three Orbiter vehicles, 
the protuberance tile and augmented instrumentation package was initially only installed on one 
Orbiter, OV-103 (Discovery). Later in the flight experiment effort, after the first three flights and 
while in preparation for the fourth and final flight of the experiment, a proposal was put forward 
and approved to add the protuberance tile to an additional Orbiter, OV-105 (Endeavour). The 
proposed implementation included a scaled back instrumentation package and the same 
protuberance height as the final flight for OV-103. 
Participation in the planning and execution of the BLT FE included personnel from Johnson 
Space Center (JSC), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Langley Research Center (LaRC), Ames 
Research Center (ARC), the United Space Alliance (USA), Boeing Houston and Boeing 
Huntington Beach. Disciplines involved included experts in hardware, ground operations, 
aerothermodynamics, aerodynamics, flight controls, thermal analysis, structural analysis, 
trajectory design, operations, loads & dynamics, impact test & analysis, instrumentation, avionics, 
software, materials & processes, manufacturing, Safety & Mission Assurance, and robotics. 
Representatives from the Astronaut Crew Office also participated. 
Because the number of flights remaining in the SSP manifest was very limited at the time the 
effort was being formulated, implementation of the flight experiment required rapid planning. 
There were only about four flights left in the manifest for each Orbiter ca. 2007. Preliminary 
reviews were held in June 2007 to formally define the flight test scope and review initial plans. In 
order for the flight experiment protuberance and augmented instrumentation to be implemented, 
reviews and concurrence from all relevant entities in the Space Shuttle Program was necessary. 
Of significance note was that in these reviews not only the technical issues required addressing. 
Perceptions of risk and related issues involving the performance of a re-entry experiment on an 
operational vehicle also needed to be resolved. After adequately addressing the concerns and 
issues for the first flight, program approval for installation of the protuberance tile was obtained in 
the fall of 2008. Re-entry for the first flight of the experiment, STS-119, occurred on March 28, 
2009. Re-entry for the second flight experiment, STS-128, occurred on September 11, 2009. Re-
entry for the third flight experiment, STS-131, occurred on April 20, 2010 and for the fourth flight, 
STS-133, on March 9, 2011. Data from the fifth flight, STS-134, with a June 1, 2011 re-entry is 
currently being assessed.  
An activity complementary to the BLT FE led by NASA LaRC was also undertaken to image 
the Orbiter during re-entry using infrared detectors. The Hypersonic Thermodynamic Infrared 
Measurements (HYTHIRM)18,19 team imaged the Orbiter on STS-119, STS-128, STS-131 and 
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STS-133 (in addition to the non-BLT FE flights STS-125 and STS-132). The team also supported 
STS-134.  
A very brief overview of the flight experiment planning and first two flights, STS-119 and STS-
128 are provided in the sections that follow, with additional information available in reference 15. 
The third (STS-131) and fourth (STS-133) flights are then discussed in detail, as well as the 
planning for the fifth and final flight, STS-134.  
 
Experiment Design Overview 
The following includes pertinent information for the STS-131 and STS-133 flights as well as 
the planning for STS-134. A discussion of the experimental design can be found in Reference 15 
and includes more detailed information on the protuberance placements, design, instrumentation 
and catalytic coating as well as information pertaining only to STS-119 and/or STS-128. 
 
Protuberance Placement 
The protuberance was placed on the port wing of the Orbiter in the same location as the 
previous flights (see Figure 1). This location was chosen because the port wing had more 
available instrumentation channels & wiring. During the planning process it was found that the 
debris environment on the port side was much more favorable, with a lower incidence of ascent 
debris related damage as well as more favorable structural and thermal margins in the predicted 
turbulent wedge. The region of the wing affected by the fully effected turbulent wedge is 
represented in Figure 1 by the blue wedge.  
 
 
Figure 1: Selected protuberance location and predicted turbulent wedge 
 
Protuberance Design 
An incremental flight envelope expansion approach involving increasing protuberance height 
has been utilized for the flight experiment. The first flight, STS-119, targeted a BLT onset of 
approximately Mach 15 in order to be sufficiently above the range of normal vehicle BLT onset 
that interpretation of the flight data would be easier. The second and third flights on STS-128 and 
STS-131 targeted approximately Mach 18, with the intent of approaching the earliest flight 
historical BLT onset Mach numbers, experienced during STS-28 and STS-73. The fourth and fifth 
flights, STS-133 and STS-134, targeted approximately Mach 19.5, with the intent of exceeding 
flight experience so that the results would be statistically significant relative to prediction 
uncertainty. The height of the protuberance was derived using the Orbiter BLT Tool6, Version 2 
with a Reθ/Me versus (k/delta)(Hw/Hs) methodology using a best estimate correlation coefficient 
established from historical Orbiter flight data. The flown protuberance height was 0.25-in for STS-
119, 0.35-in for both STS-128 and STS-131 and 0.5-in for STS-133 and STS-134. As with the 
first two flights, aerothermal, thermal, and stress analysis was performed for the protuberance, 
the area immediately surrounding the protuberance, and the downstream regions within and 
immediately surrounding the turbulent wedge.  
A photograph of the final design is shown in Figure 2. The length and width of the 
protuberance installed on the vehicle were 4.0” and approximately 0.4”, respectively, for all five 
flights. The protuberance was machined into the tile such that the leading edge was oriented at 
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an angle of 453˚ relative to the predicted local flow streamline. This angle and uncertainty were 
determined graphically using installed hardware pictures that were then scaled onto CFD 
solutions together with a tile layout. The three-degree uncertainty in the orientation angle comes 
primarily from the accuracy of angle determination from the combined hardware images and 
streamline orientation angles, and can be considered a 2-sigma value. 
Before and after each flight of the BLT FE, the protuberance and the surface within the 
predicted turbulent wedge were scanned using Optigo and Metris laser scanning equipment. The 
purpose of the scanning was to allow for the quantification of any surface changes associated 
with the re-entry heating, specifically slumping or shape change of the protuberance tile. The 3D 
scans were performed using the Optigo 200 and Metris Laser Radars. All post flight alignments 
were done in Geomagic software20, using the best fit method. For the first three flights, STS-119, 
STS-128 and STS-131, the protuberance and catalytic tiles were removed from the vehicle post-
flight for additional bench scanning and to allow for the installation of the tiles for the next flight. 
For the last flight of Discovery, STS-133, the tiles were left on the vehicle. This was done 
because post-flight visual inspections as well as surface scans revealed that there had been no 
significant shape change and as it was the last flight on Discovery there was no need to prepare 
the vehicle for additional flights. The current intent is thus that the flight experiment tiles will follow 
Discovery to her future home and serve as museum articles and testimonies to the success of the 
Space Shuttle Program.  
 
Catalytic Coated Tiles 
The catalytic coating was applied to two tiles on Discovery for the STS-128 flight and a single 
tile for the STS-131 and STS-133 flights. For STS-131 and STS-133 the tile was in close 
proximity to the center of the predicted turbulent wedge, though not in the center. A figure 
showing the coating applied to the tiles (pre-flight) is shown in Figure 3. A single tile (on the 
wedge centerline) was coated with the catalytic material for the STS-134 flight of Endeavour. 
Additional information on the catalytic tiles can be found in references 15 and 21-24. 
 
 
Figure 2: Final protuberance shape 
 
Figure 3: Catalytic Coated Tile on STS-133 
 
Trajectory Design 
As with the previous flights, extensive coordination took place with flight design personnel, 
flight dynamics officers, and the Ascent-Entry Flight Techniques Panel to communicate potential 
impacts of Orbiter maneuvers on the flight experiment data. During entry the Orbiter executes a 
series of roll maneuvers. These roll maneuvers have been hypothesized to affect BLT onset 
because of the angle of attack and sideslip modulation associated with them. The team 
established desired ‘cut-off’ intervals of ±1 Mach number on either side of the predicted BLT 
onset Mach numbers in order to avoid roll reversals during that period of the re-entry. A flight rule 
related to the flight experiment was established that allows for de-orbit burn modification to occur 
if the cut-off intervals are violated for the primary entry opportunity on the first day for which an 
entry is attempted. Within this framework, there was no ability to affect the timing of roll reversals 
for other landing opportunities beyond the primary landing opportunity defined several days in 
advance to entry. The Mach number cut-off intervals did affect mission decisions during STS-131. 
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Flight Director approval occurred during STS-131 for a retrograde separation and orbit 
adjustment that pushed the End of Mission (EOM) crossrange outside of the BLT FE crossrange 
cutout.  
In addition to the possibility of the roll maneuvers affecting the time of BLT onset, the first 
three flights of the BLT FE as well as many previous shuttle missions have experienced a 
thermocouple anomaly that seems to be associated with the roll maneuver. The anomaly did not 
affect the time of boundary layer transition but did in many cases make interpretation of the data 
difficult and resulted in less accurate temperature measurements for certain portions of the 
trajectory. During the anomaly, the temperature traces exhibit rapid (or in a few cases, slow) 
shifts up or down at the same time as the roll reversal. This anomaly had a significant effect on 
STS-128 and as a result the team began to discuss ways to reduce or eliminate the effects. Prior 
to STS-133, an effort was undertaken to design a re-entry plan that would allow for a delay of all 
vehicle roll reversals until after Mach 16. Mach 16 was selected to allow for approximately 100 
seconds of higher quality flight data, hopefully unaffected by the temperature anomaly. In order to 
achieve this, a re-entry trajectory with a large cross-range was necessary which effectively delays 
the roll reversal to a Mach number lower than 16 due to the manner in which the Orbiter guidance 
affects roll-reversals for energy management and an accurate approach to the landing location.  
A number of ideas were proposed and investigated in order to enable approximately 100 
seconds of flight data unaffected by the temperature anomaly. These include  
1) Instead of landing at KSC on the first available opportunity, waiting until a trajectory that 
met the requirements was available. This would have required saving consumables and 
possibly giving up otherwise viable re-entry opportunities 
2) An orbit adjust to try to bring as many trajectories as possible up to the desired cross-
range. 
3) Opening the first heading error deadband to try to delay the first roll reversal, although 
depending on the complexity of the change, the lead time may have already been too 
long for this option. An option to do this manually was also presented, though additional 
risks were associated with this. 
Ultimately it was determined that the best option was to use an orbit adjust to try to extend 
the cross-range for as many of the re-entry opportunities as possible. A flight rule was written and 
proposed to the Ascent and Entry Flight Techniques Panel in August 2010. The rule was 
approved but with the understanding that this was the lowest priority flight rule. It is essential that 
all other landing constraints would have to be met first, including protecting for adequate landing 
opportunities, ensuring sufficient consumables remained and that all safety requirements were 
met. 
The first opportunity to utilize the flight rule came during the STS-133 re-entry. Flight 
Dynamics Officers (FDOs) worked throughout the mission, including the two additional days 
added to the mission, to determine the requirements necessary to bring the most opportunities to 
the table that could potentially satisfy the Mach cut-off flight rule. This included the assumption 
based on predicted stable weather patterns that the shuttle would most likely be able to land on 
the first day. For this reason, preference was placed on working to satisfy the flight rule for those 
entry opportunities. The goal was to develop an orbit adjust that would result in as many 3-sigma 
(preferably) or 1-sigma (second choice) re-entry opportunities with the first roll reversal occurring 
after Mach 16. Unfortunately the first KSC (KSC 202) entry of the first landing day started with a 
very small crossrange. This meant that a large retrograde burn (155 fps) would have been 
required on undocking day in order to at least meet the 1-sigma criteria. The timing and 
magnitude of the orbit adjust are both important, because the integrated effect on the orbit is 
cumulative over time. A larger time between the orbit adjust and entry allows for more of an 
impact on the entry. While possible, it would have been difficult to fit in the timeline and more 
significantly might have affected the emergency de-orbit capability by eliminating the ability to re-
rendezvous with the station. This was a significant concern because the burn would have had to 
have been completed prior to completion of the late TPS inspection and could have prevented re-
rendezvous with the station in the event of a TPS issue being identified during inspection. Due to 
these constraints, the decision was made not to execute the new flight rule during STS-133. As a 
result, the re-entry had a roll reversal at Mach 21.6. 
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It should be noted that the higher priority flight rule, protecting against roll reversals during the 
period ±1 Mach number from the expected BLT onset was still in effect and had existed since 
STS-119. Since the entry trajectories for STS-133 did not nominally violate this flight rule, 
implementation was not needed for this flight, but would have provided a mechanism in planning 
the entry trajectory to protect against roll reversals between Mach 20 and 18. 
 
Instrumentation Overview 
Figure 4 shows a sketch of instrumentation locations for STS-119, STS-128, STS-131 and 
STS-133 (it should be noted that STS-131 and STS-133 are the only two flights to utilize the 
same instrumentation layouts). White symbols represent instrument locations active for all four 
flights. Because some of the instruments were not used for all of the flights, instruments that were 
active for STS-119 only are colored purple, for STS-128 only are colored green and STS-128, 
STS-131 and STS-133 are colored yellow. The catalytic coated tiles have boxes or triangles 
surrounding their location which are associated with tiles that were coated for STS-128, STS-131 
and STS-133 or STS-128 only, respectively. It is important to note that the flight experiment team 
was limited to ten active thermocouple measurements because of data acquisition system (DAS) 
constraints in the wing region. Additional information about the instrumentation system can be 
found in Reference 16.  
 
 
Figure 4: Instrumentation locations for STS-119, STS-128, STS-131 and STS-133. 
 
Since the OV-103/Discovery instrumentation layout had to be designed prior to STS-119, 
more than ten instrument locations were implemented to facilitate some flexibility in instrument 
location selection for specific flights. The differences in instrumentation layout between STS-119, 
STS-128 and STS-131/STS-133 were implemented to (1) obtain higher resolution on the 
turbulent wedge angle and (2) to take measurements in the two catalytic coated tiles during STS-
128 and single catalytic tile during STS-131 and STS-133. For STS-131 and STS-133, the single 
catalytic coated tile contained two thermocouples; one near the beginning and one in the center 
of the coated region. The thermocouples were placed in this manner to measure the catalytic 
jump due to a mismatched material25 and to measure the general catalytic behavior of the 
coating, respectively. 
For the purposes of comparison to HYTHIRM data and computational predictions, the 
uncertainty levels associated with the thermocouple measurements were assessed. The 
components that contribute to the overall uncertainty include a precision uncertainty due to the bit 
resolution and recording steps in the measurement system, a Modular Auxiliary Data System 
(MADS) stability precision uncertainty, and a calibration curve precision uncertainty. In 
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combination, these precision uncertainties are estimated to be ±20˚F (1-sigma). In addition to this 
precision uncertainty, there is also a known bias error due to installation effects. It is estimated 
that the actual tile surface temperature is approximately 20˚F hotter than the values reported by 
the thermocouple measurement due to the thermocouple placement slightly below the actual tile 
surface. This bias effect is location dependent as each thermocouple is installed at a slightly 
different depth26.  
 
STS-119 Summary 
STS-119 had a 0.25-inch protuberance and a predicted BLT onset of Mach 15.4. Detailed 
information on the STS-119 flight can be found in reference 15. A post-flight review of the 
thermocouple data showed a relatively early (~Mach 11.5) asymmetric BLT event on the 
starboard side of the Orbiter during re-entry, observed in HYTHIRM imagery18,19 as shown in 
Figure 5 (near Mach 9). Thermocouple 1 (hereafter referred to as TC 1), located at the center of 
the predicted flight experiment wedge, showed the earliest sign of BLT at Mach 15.6. The 
maximum temperature experienced by any thermocouple was 2012 deg F and was seen during 
laminar heating on the protuberance.  
 
 
Figure 5: HYTHIRM imagery from STS-119. See References 18, 19 
 
The protuberance tile was removed from the vehicle in a non-destructive manner and was 
sent to material experts for additional study. It was scanned pre- and post-flight to assess the 
protuberance shape change and did not change appreciably.  
Comparisons between predicted and earliest observed BLT onset times were very favorable 
(within ±1-σ). Comparisons between predicted and observed temperatures were not as favorable 
and of particular note was the predicted temperature on the protuberance. The pre-flight 
protuberance temperature prediction was 2892˚F based on the pre-flight STS-119 trajectory. The 
maximum reported temperature on the protuberance was 2012˚F. This nearly 900˚F difference 
equates to a difference in heat flux of over a factor of four. The cause of the large discrepancy 
between predicted and observed temperatures is currently unknown. However, hypotheses for 
the cause of the discrepancy include non-continuum effects27, gross errors in the prediction of the 
boundary layer profile or extent of the separation upstream of the protuberance and errors in the 
prediction of the thermal response. 
 
STS-128 Summary  
STS-128 had a 0.35-inch protuberance and a predicted BLT onset of Mach 17.4. Detailed 
information on the STS-128 flight can be found in reference 15. Similar to STS-119, Discovery 
experienced an early asymmetric BLT event, though this asymmetric event took place upstream 
of the port wing at approximately Mach 13.6. Figure 6 shows the turbulent wedge for an assumed 
disturbance location. The effects of this upstream event made it challenging to interpret portions 
of the flight experiment data as it washed over the protuberance.  
TC 1 is located at the center of the predicted flight experiment wedge and shows the earliest 
sign of non-laminar behavior at Mach 17.5. The maximum temperature from the measurements 
was just below 2600˚F and was experienced by the protuberance. At 350 seconds, a number of 
the flight experiment thermocouples exhibit undesired and erroneous behavior. In retrospect, this 
behavior has been observed historically on nearly all regions where Orbiter tile surface 
temperature measurements are made (wing, fuselage, Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pod) 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
8 
 
and generally manifests itself as a rapid or gradual decrease or increase in the temperature 
occurring at the same time as a vehicle roll maneuver.  
 
 
Figure 6: Post-flight reconstruction of asymmetric BLT event. 
 
The protuberance tile was removed from the vehicle post flight in a non-destructive manner. It 
was scanned prior to and after the mission with Optigo and Metris systems and was scanned 
again on a bench top using an Optigo optical system to assess the protuberance shape change 
which was not appreciable.  
Comparisons between predicted and the earliest observed BLT onset time was very 
favorable (within ±1-σ). Comparisons between predicted and observed temperatures for STS-128 
were better than the comparisons for STS-119; however, the CFD predictions were still higher 
than actual measurements. This improvement can be attributed to the fact that the STS-128 pre-
flight predictions were adjusted based on the STS-119 flight data.  
 
Analysis in Support of Flight Experiment #3  
Due to the thermocouple anomaly experienced during STS-128 and the subsequent difficulty 
in determining peak laminar temperatures on both the protuberance as well as the rest of the tile 
acreage within the turbulent wedge, the decision was made to re-fly the 0.35-inch protuberance. 
Because this was a re-flight of an already analyzed boundary layer trip configuration, significantly 
less additional analysis and effort was required to achieve program approval for the third flight, 
STS-131. 
 
STS-131  
Mission Overview 
For STS-131, Space Shuttle Discovery launched from Kennedy Space Center on April 5, 
2010. The mission consisted of 3 spacewalks and the Orbiter was docked to the International 
Space Station (ISS) for 10 days. The three spacewalks consisted of, among many other tasks, 
installing a new Ammonia Tank Assembly (ATA) and retrieving Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris 
(MMOD) shields. The Orbiter also carried with it the Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) 
Leonardo, which was filled with supplies for the ISS. All prime objectives of the mission were 
achieved and Discovery landed safely at KSC in Florida on April 20, 2010. 
Unlike both STS-119 and STS-128, post-flight examination of thermocouple data showed that 
boundary layer transition on Discovery was symmetric. The vehicle experienced BLT relatively 
late in the trajectory, at approximately Mach 6.8. Figure 7 shows the thermocouples and 
associated BLT Mach numbers on the vehicle. HYTHIRM observations at closest approach were 
at approximately Mach 15 and are shown in Figure 8.  
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Figure 7: STS-131 flight turbulent 
heating temperature maximums at 
BET derived Mach numbers  
Figure 8: STS-131 HYTHIRM imagery18, 19 
 
Flight Data Overview 
For convenience during the discussion of the flight data, the labeled flight experiment 
thermocouples are shown in Figure 9. Thermocouple time traces are shown in Figure 10 and 
Figure 11 and are plotted in two different figures for the sake of clarity. Figure 10 shows the 
thermocouple data associated with the flight experiment thermocouples that are furthest aft, while 
Figure 11 shows the data for thermocouples farther forward and on the protuberance. The data 
are plotted using the STS-131 post-flight best estimate trajectory (BET).  
A quick glance at the aft thermocouple traces in Figure 10 demonstrates that temperatures 
did not exceed 2000˚F, with the peak temperatures experienced during the turbulent portion of 
the entry. With the exception of TC 1, TC 3a and TC 3b, temperatures during the laminar portion 
of the trajectory were all similar with peak laminar temperatures between approximately 1500 and 
1600˚F. It should be noted again that both TC 3a and TC 3b had catalytic coating applied to the 
surface. As such, the elevated temperatures in relation to the other aft thermocouples are 
expected. It is also worthwhile to note that because of the thermocouple placement at the 
beginning of the catalytic coating, it was expected that TC 3b would exhibit a higher temperature 
than TC 3a.  
TC 1 is located at the center of the predicted wedge and shows the earliest sign of non-
laminar behavior at 929 seconds. This corresponds to a Mach number of 17.4 based on the BET. 
The thermocouple data then indicates that the transitional wedge progresses inboard, as 
expected, with TC 3a and 3b (both Mach 15.1, 1012 sec) showing the next sign of non-laminar 
behavior, followed by TC 6 (Mach 14.8, 1022 sec). There appears to be a delay in BLT of 
approximately 90 seconds between TC 6 and TC 4 (Mach 12.0, 1109 sec) and another 50 
seconds between TC 4 and TC 7 (Mach 10.5, 1157 sec). Based on this information, it appears 
that the transitional wedge was initially very narrow before widening later in the trajectory. It 
should be noted that a number of the thermocouples exhibit the same sudden drop or drifting 
behavior that was observed in the STS-128 data as well as intermittently in other historical shuttle 
flight data. The onset of the behavior appears to coincide with initiation of roll reversal 
maneuvers, including the initial roll from a wings level attitude.  
Figure 11 shows the thermocouple traces for the forward and protuberance thermocouples. 
As is shown, the maximum temperature from the measurements was just below 2200˚F and was 
experienced by the protuberance. Examination of the thermocouple traces for these forward 
instruments shows that all of the forward thermocouples exhibit a drop in temperature at 
approximately 750 seconds, the same time that a roll reversal maneuver is initiated. TC2 shows 
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unexpected behavior at the initiation of roll, approximately 300 seconds after EI, when the trace 
levels out instead of continuing to rise throughout laminar heating as the other traces do. 
 
 
Figure 9: Thermocouple labels for STS-131. 
 
 
Figure 10: STS-131 data for aft 
thermocouples 
 
 
Figure 11: STS-131 data for forward 
thermocouples 
During the early portion of the trajectory it can be seen that the protuberance thermocouple 
exhibits the highest temperature (2085 ˚F) and has a laminar peak at approximately 650 seconds. 
At 750 seconds the temperature then suddenly decreases over 1000 °F (at the same time as a 
roll reversal maneuver) before rising again. It then rises to the maximum temperature at around 
1115 seconds (2197 ˚F). Protuberance BLT was assessed to have taken place at 1259 seconds 
(Mach 7.7). Post-flight visual examination of the protuberance surface by material experts 
corroborates that the temperature on the protuberance did not exceed 2600 °F with actual 
maximum temperatures possibly significantly less. 
TC 5, located just aft of the protuberance, experienced a continual rise in temperature over 
the course of the early portion of the trajectory. This behavior is attributed to the location of the 
measurement into the vortex-scrubbing region. This vortex heating interaction to the surface 
masks clear interpretation of the BLT time, although it was estimated at 996 seconds (Mach 
15.6).  
TC 2 reaches a laminar peak relatively early in the trajectory and then steadily decreases 
before experiencing a rapid rise in temperature. The rapid rise in temperature is assumed to have 
been caused by transition from the BLT FE protuberance. V07T9666A seems to exhibit behavior 
similar to STS-119 and is nominal with the exception of the drop at 750 seconds that all of the 
flight experiment thermocouples experienced. 
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The cause for the measurement anomalies observed on STS-131 is currently unknown, 
although similar behavior has been seen on previous Orbiter missions, including STS-128 and 
STS-119. Thermocouple anomaly onset on this flight seems to correlate with the initiation of roll 
reversals. In this case, the first roll reversal occurred much later than in STS-128 (750 seconds 
compared to 350 seconds) allowing for significantly more laminar data to be collected. As a 
result, laminar heating levels are much clearer and offer more confidence than those from STS-
128. This resulting higher confidence data for the laminar heating levels related to the flight 
experiment became very helpful in establishing higher confidence flight environment predictions 
for subsequent missions. 
Following the flight of STS-131, tiles downstream of the protuberance were examined by TPS 
and material experts in a manner similar to STS-119 and STS-128. Based on experience it was 
determined none of the downstream tiles exceeded a temperature of 2500˚F. This information 
has proven useful in post-flight reconstruction, and served as an upper bound on the predicted 
flight temperatures. A runway photograph of the protuberance post-flight is shown in Figure 12. 
Note the gray ‘spotting’ that is believed to be due to water exposure on the pad that leads to later 
aggregation of surface coloring differences. 
 
 
Figure 12: Post-flight runway photograph of STS-131 (0.35-inch) protuberance. 
 
The protuberance tile was removed from the vehicle in a non-destructive manner and was 
sent to material experts for additional study. The tile was scanned prior to and after the mission 
with Optigo and Metris systems and was scanned again on a bench top using an Optigo 
measuring optical system to assess the protuberance shape change. A maximum flattening on 
the protuberance of 0.01” was measured (Figure 13). In addition, the catalytic coated tile was 
removed from the vehicle and replaced with a new LI-900 tile. The catalytic coating seemed to 
hold up better on STS-131 as compared to STS-128. The forward edge appeared to be fully 
intact while the aft edge did appear to have some material loss (Figure 14), as noted by the 
speckled appearance. 
 
(a) (b)  
Figure 13: Pre- and post-flight comparison of STS-131 protuberance tile, (a) forward side 
of protuberance, (b) aft side of protuberance  
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Figure 14: Post-flight runway photograph of catalytic coating following STS-131. 
 
Flight Data and Analysis Prediction Comparisons 
Comparisons between predicted and earliest observed BLT onset times were again very 
favorable. The predicted onset time for a 0.35-inch height using the BET was Mach 17.2. The 
observed BLT onset time at TC 1 was Mach 17.4. This is within the ±1-σ prediction uncertainty of 
the BLT Tool6. 
As with the previous flights, the engineering heating environment predictions calibrated with 
previous flight data lead the thermal math model temperature predictions to be higher than actual 
measurements. The predicted ISS Heavy Forward (ISSHVFW) certification case and actual 
temperatures are shown in Table 1. The maximum predicted temperature on the protuberance, 
based on the ISSHVFW case was 2654˚F, as compared to the maximum-recorded temperature 
on the protuberance during STS-131 of 2197˚F. Similar to the previous flights, the ability to 
compare predictions to actual flight data was less precise for the tiles surrounding the 
protuberance because of the sparseness of the instrumentation. Material expert evaluation led to 
conclusive statements that the tile coating temperature did not exceed 2500˚F. This is in contrast 
to the maximum pre-flight prediction of 2995˚F for the protuberance tile acreage. However, it is 
believed that the temperatures were actually lower than 2500˚F and so the over-prediction is 
more severe than this initial comparison suggests. It is also important to note that the predictions 
summarized in Table 1 are for a certification case that utilizes a much earlier vehicle BLT time 
than that experienced on STS-131 (Mach 16.9 in the analysis vs. the actual 7.7 for the 
protuberance). The time of vehicle BLT is very important because it determines when the 
protuberance itself will experience turbulent heating. This is separate from the time that BLT 
occurs downstream of the protuberance, which is primarily affected by the protuberance height. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Prediction and Flight Temperatures for STS-131 
Material Peak Temperature (˚F) 
 ISSHVFW Mach 16.9 Actual (Trip-Mach 7.7) 
Protuberance Laminar 2216 2197 
Protuberance Turbulent 2654 2053 
BRI-18 Laminar 2518 <2500 
BRI-18 Turbulent 2925 <2500 
LI-2200 Laminar 2471 <2500 
LI-2200 Turbulent 2890 <2500 
LI-900 Laminar 2174 1949 
LI-900 Turbulent 2475 2022 
RTV 489  
Aluminum 186  
 
Analysis in Support of Flight Experiment #4  
As a result of the additional analysis and the cleaner, though still somewhat compromised, 
STS-131 flight data, rationale was developed to fly a 0.5-inch protuberance on the fourth BLT FE 
flight, STS-133. A similar analysis procedure was used for the fourth flight as was used for the 
second flight, STS-128, when the protuberance height was increased from 0.25 to 0.35 inches. 
Flow Direction 
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This included the use of a knockdown factor, “k,” adjusted for the additional STS- 128 and STS-
131 data. The factor “k” is the value necessary to match the flight data to the pre-flight 
predictions, and is then applied to the next higher protuberance height. More information on the 
knockdown factor can be found in reference 15. Following derivation of knockdown factors from 
the STS-131 data (0.35-inch protuberance), the results were applied to the STS-133 (0.5-inch 
protuberance) pre-flight certification analysis. While 0.35-inch protuberance CFD solutions were 
used for the STS-131 reconstruction and knockdown factor derivation, 0.50-inch protuberance 
CFD heating distributions were used to provide the distribution of heating magnitudes for the 
STS-133 certification analysis17. In this approach, the knockdown factors are applied to the CFD 
predicted distributions to define the applied engineering calibrated heating predictions. 
For the STS-133 certification analysis, the BLT time was derived using a generic ISS return 
trajectory, a protuberance height of 0.50-inches, and the Reθ/Me correlation in the BLT version 2 
tool6. Results of the analysis are shown in Table 2. For the heating distributions and unadjusted 
augmentation factor predictions, CFD solutions were available at Mach numbers of 20, 18, 15, 
and 12. Linear interpolation was carried out on the values for k and BFCFD for points in the 
trajectory between the available CFD solutions. 
 
Table 2: STS-133 predictions for ISSHVFW and pre-flight STS-133 trajectories. 
Material Peak Temperature (˚F) ISSHVFW M14.6 STS-133 Mission Specific Trajectory 
Protuberance 2944 2870 
Protuberance tile acreage 2533 2384 
LI-2200 tile 2527 2367 
LI-900 tile 2284 2216 
RTV 472 444 
Aluminum structure 174 162 
 
In the case of the ISSHVFW return trajectory (which was used for certification of STS-133), 
a material temperature waiver was required for the protuberance as the predicted temperature of 
2944˚F exceeded the single-use limit for Boeing Replacement Insulation (BRI)-18 by 44˚F for 35 
seconds. Rationale for the appropriateness of the waiver was based on the fact that (1) the 
predicted time of the over-temperature condition was relatively short (2) a certification-level 
(conservative) trajectory was being used for the assessment and (3) despite the surface over-
temperature condition, acceptable tile factors of safety and structural margins were predicted. It 
was also believed that the analysis was still conservative, even after the adjustments made 
following STS-119, STS-128 and STS-131. One significant source of conservatism is the vehicle 
weight. The re-entry weight associated with the ISSHVFW trajectory was approximately 30,000 
lbs more than the actual STS-133 re-entry weight. 
Because of ground operations schedule constraints, a decision on the plans for the fourth 
flight experiment (STS-133, originally planned for November 2010, but delayed until February 
2011 due to cracks in the stringers on the external tank) was needed relatively soon following 
STS-131. Analysis was completed within two months and a recommendation from the BLT FE 
team was accepted by the SSP to fly a 0.50-in protuberance on STS-133. The catalytic coating 
was also re-flown. Approval for flight of the highest protuberance height, which would result in 
BLT onset beyond our historical Orbiter flight experience, required significant discussion with the 
Crew Office. The last two flights of the BLT FE would not have occurred without intensive 
coordination between the flight experiment project / technical leadership team, the Orbiter Project, 
Safety and members of the Program Control Requirements Board (PRCB). This experience 
demonstrates that flight testing on operational vehicles is still possible. However, future flight 
testing efforts should be aware that issues only partially motivated by technical issues and more 
motivated by perceptions need to be addressed in order to be successful. Ultimately, overcoming 
issues associated with perception need to focus on effectively communicating information and 
addressing concerns from the perspective of the individuals asking questions. Concurrently with 
the approval for STS-133, an additional flight, “BLT lite” to be flown on STS-134 (Endeavour), 
was also approved. STS-134 would utilize the 0.5-inch protuberance that had been accepted for 
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STS-133, the catalytic coating and a reduced set of on-board instrumentation. Details of this flight 
will be discussed in a later section.  
Some weeks after the catalytic coating was applied to Discovery for STS-133 it was noted 
that the edges of the coating were coming apart from the tile. It was determined that the most 
likely cause was that the tape used during the spraying process to mask off the surrounding tile 
area was left on the vehicle too long. Similar to when painters tape is left on a wall too long and 
may pull up or loosen paint when removed, the tape caused the edges of the coating to loosen. 
This was an important lesson learned for the program and the situation was remedied by carefully 
trimming the edges of the coating. After this was completed, the surface was tested with shop air 
and no additional peeling was noted, nor was it noted in subsequent checks prior to flight.  
Because STS-133 was rolled out the launch pad and then back to the Vehicle Assembly 
Building (VAB) after cracks were found in the external tank stringers, the catalytic coating was 
continually monitored. After several weeks back in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), a white 
residue was noted on the surface. Samples were carefully collected and though material testing 
was, overall, inconclusive there were indications that the residue was most likely due to the 
launch pad environment and consisted of salt and or sand with only minimal contamination due to 
the foam associated with the external tank repairs. No further actions were taken prior to flight. 
 
STS-133  
Mission Overview 
For STS-133, Space Shuttle Discovery launched from Kennedy Space Center on February 
24, 2011. The mission had 2 spacewalks and the Orbiter was docked to the ISS for 10 days. The 
two spacewalks consisted of, among many other tasks, moving the old ammonia pump and 
installing power cables linking Unity and Tranquility. The Orbiter also carried with it the 
Permanent Multi-Purpose Module Leonardo, which was left permanently docked to one of the 
station's ports, the third Expediting the Process of Experiments to the Space Station (ExPRESS) 
Logistics Carrier and the humanoid robot, Robonaut. All prime objectives of the mission were 
achieved. Discovery landed safely at Kennedy Space Center in Florida on March 9, 2011. 
Like STS-131, post-flight examination of thermocouple data showed that Discovery had 
experienced symmetric BLT during the STS-133 re-entry. The BLT was relatively nominal for 
Discovery, at approximately Mach 8.1. Figure 15 shows the thermocouples and associated BLT 
BET derived Mach numbers on the vehicle. HYTHIRM observations at closest approach were at 
approximately Mach 18 and are shown in Figure 16.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: STS-133 flight turbulent heating temperature maximums at BET derived Mach 
numbers 
Flight Data Overview 
For convenience during the discussion of the flight data, the labeled flight experiment 
thermocouples are shown in Figure 17. Thermocouple time traces are shown in Figure 18 and 
Figure 19. Similar to the STS-131 presentation, the thermocouple data are plotted in two different 
plots for the sake of clarity. Figure 18 shows the thermocouple data associated with the flight 
experiment thermocouples that are furthest aft, while Figure 19 shows the data for thermocouples 
farther forward and on the protuberance. The data is plotted using the post-flight STS-133 BET.   
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Figure 16: STS-133 HYTHIRM imagery15, 19 
 
A quick glance at the aft thermocouple traces in Figure 18 shows that temperatures did not 
exceed 2000˚F, with the peak temperatures experienced during the turbulent portion of the entry. 
With the exception of TC 3a and TC 3b, temperatures during the laminar portion of the trajectory 
were all similar with peak laminar temperatures between approximately 1500 and 1600˚F. It 
should be noted again that both TC 3a and TC 3b locations had catalytic coating applied to the 
tile surface. As such, the elevated temperatures in relation to the other aft thermocouples are 
expected. It is also worthwhile to note that because of the thermocouple placement at the 
beginning of the catalytic coating, it was expected that TC 3b would exhibit a higher temperature 
than TC 3a, with an offset of approximately 130 deg F throughout the laminar region. 
TC 1 is located at the center of the predicted wedge and shows the earliest sign of non-
laminar behavior at 725 seconds, corresponding to a Mach number of 21.8 based on the BET. 
For the next almost 200 seconds the TC 1 thermocouple trace oscillates up and down three full 
cycles before beginning a final increase at 916 seconds (Mach 17.3). This behavior resulted in 
four possible indications of boundary layer transition onset, including 725 sec (Mach 21.8), 763 
seconds (Mach 21.1), 829 seconds (Mach 19.6) and 916 seconds (Mach 17.3). It is believed that 
the first two times do not represent boundary layer transition because the same behavior (rapid 
increase, rapid decrease, followed by a rapid increase) is shown in multiple thermocouples (TC 2, 
TC 5, 9666, the body flap, the port elevon and the protuberance). This includes a number of 
thermocouple locations that are not associated with the flight experiment and would not be 
influenced by the transitional wedge. The behaviors line up with each other within a few DAS 
cycles (several seconds) in each case. In addition, these events correlate with observed orbiter 
actions such as a roll reversal, shown to have caused similar behavior on previous flights. As a 
result, Mach 19.6 and 17.3 remain as possible BLT onset Mach numbers for STS-133. HYTHIRM 
images collected at approximately Mach 18 indicate that there was a wedge present downstream 
of the protuberance, indicating that Mach 19.6 is the more likely condition for BLT onset. It is 
possible that TC 1 may not have been in the center of the transitional wedge at all times and that 
the wedge, starting very narrow, may have started near Mach 19.6 and then moved off the 
thermocouple when the vehicle orientation shifted as it does during the re-entry, causing it to 
appear that the data was re-laminarizing before the wedge moved back over TC 1 at Mach 17.3. 
The thermocouple data indicates that the transitional wedge progresses inboard, as 
expected, with TC 3b and 3a (Mach 17.0, 925 sec and Mach 16.9, 929 sec respectively) showing 
the next sign of non-laminar behavior, followed by TC 6 (Mach 15.4, 980 sec), TC 4 (Mach 14.2, 
1014 sec) and then a delay of almost 100 seconds between TC 4 and TC 7 (Mach 11.3, 1106 
sec). TC 7 appears to re-laminarize at the same time as the roll reversal at approximately 1140 
seconds and then transition again at Mach 9.3 (1168 seconds). This could be explained by the 
fact that TC 7 is the most inboard thermocouple and thus on the edge of the transitional wedge. 
The roll reversal caused a change in the vehicle yaw which may have caused the wedge to move 
slightly outboard and off of TC 7. At Mach 9.3 the wedge may have expanded enough that it 
reached TC7 again or the yaw may have shifted back enough to bring the wedge back over TC 7.  
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
16 
 
 
Figure 17: Thermocouple labels for STS-133. 
 
 
Figure 18: STS-133 data for aft 
thermocouples 
 
Figure 19: STS-133 data for forward 
thermocouples 
 
Based on this information, it appears that the transitional wedge was initially very narrow 
before widening later in the trajectory. It should be noted that a number of the thermocouples 
exhibit the sudden drop or drifting behavior that was observed in the STS-128 and STS-131 data. 
The onset of the behavior coincides with initiation of roll reversal maneuvers. Of the aft 
thermocouples, it appears that TC1, 3a and 3b were the most affected by the anomaly. 
Figure 19 shows the thermocouple traces for the forward and protuberance thermocouples. 
As is shown, the maximum temperature from the measurements was just below 2300˚F and was 
experienced by the protuberance under laminar conditions. Examination of the thermocouple 
traces shows that all of the forward thermocouples exhibit a drop in temperature at approximately 
750 seconds, the same time that a roll reversal maneuver is initiated. 
During the early portion of the trajectory it can be seen that the protuberance thermocouple 
reached a maximum laminar temperature of 2166 degrees F at approximately 650 seconds. At 
750 seconds the temperature then suddenly decreases over 1300 °F in 40 seconds (at the same 
time as a roll reversal maneuver) before beginning to rise again. The thermocouple trace is very 
similar to STS-131, which also experienced a roll reversal at about 750 seconds. It then rises to 
the maximum temperature at approximately 1100 seconds (2288 deg). It should be noted that this 
is still in the laminar heating regime. Protuberance BLT was assessed to have taken place at 
1204 seconds (Mach 8.3). Post-flight visual examination of the protuberance surface by material 
experts corroborates that the temperature on the protuberance did not exceed 2600 °F. 
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TC 5, located just aft of the protuberance, experienced a rise in temperature over the course 
of the early portion of the trajectory. This behavior is attributed to the measurement intentionally 
being placed within the vortex-scrubbing region caused by the streamwise vortex that originates 
at the protuberance trailing edge. This vortex heating as well as the thermocouple-anomaly-
induced drop in the temperature at 750 seconds complicates any clear interpretation of the BLT 
time, although the data support estimates at either 906 seconds (Mach 17.6) or 1087 seconds 
(Mach 11.9).  
TC 2 effectively stops rising at the first onset of vehicle roll at about 300 seconds. Just prior to 
the first roll reversal the thermocouple indicates a sharp rise and then drop in the temperature, 
similar to the behavior of TC 1. This occurs at the same time as a change in the vehicle yaw and 
may indicate that the vortex is briefly rolling over the thermocouple before the vehicle roll 
stabilizes again. This makes the determination of the maximum laminar temperature of TC 2 very 
difficult. BLT onset for TC 2 is believed to have occurred at either 888 seconds (Mach 18.1) or 
953 seconds (Mach 16.2). V07T9666A seems to exhibit expected behavior with the exception of 
the drop at 750 seconds that a number of the thermocouples experienced. BLT appears to have 
occurred at 1232 seconds (Mach 7.6), roughly at the same time as the remainder of the orbiter 
acreage experienced BLT, and relatively nominally for OV-103. 
Anomaly onset on this flight seems to correlate with the initiation of roll reversals, as with the 
previous flights. During STS-133, the first roll reversal occurred at approximately the same time 
as it occurred on STS-131 and much later than in STS-128 (750 seconds compared to 350 
seconds).  
Following the flight of STS-133, tiles downstream of the protuberance were examined by TPS 
and material experts. According to the runway report, the BLT protrusion was in good condition, 
with some glazing on the tip. A runway photograph of the protuberance is shown in Figure 20 and 
the catalytic coating tile is shown in Figure 21. The catalytic coating was missing some coating 
from the forward outboard edge of its footprint. It was noted earlier that the catalytic coating did 
have issues with peeling pre-flight and this may explain some of the missing coating on the 
edges. Based on experience it was determined none of the downstream tiles exceeded a 
temperature of 2500˚F.   
 
Figure 20: Post-flight runway photograph of STS-133 (0.50-inch) protuberance. 
 
Because this was the final flight of OV-103 (Discovery) and the tiles were in good overall 
condition, the decision was made not to remove either of the tiles. The tiles were scanned prior to 
and after the mission with Optigo and Metris systems to assess the protuberance shape change. 
A maximum deviation on the protuberance of 0.006 inches was measured (with a standard 
deviation of 0.001 inches for the resulting digital surface definition). Images of the protuberance 
tile changes between pre- and post-flight measurements are shown in Figure 22. Overall the 
catalytic coating seemed to hold up well, with the exception of the material loss at the forward 
edge of the coating.  
 
Flight Data and Analysis Prediction Comparisons 
Comparisons between predicted and earliest observed BLT were difficult on this flight due to 
the uncertainty in the actual BLT onset Mach number associated with TC1. This difficulty is 
Flow Direction
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
18 
 
primarily due to occurrence of the thermocouple anomaly. The predicted onset time for a 0.50-
inch height using the STS-133 EOM mission specific trajectory was Mach 19.2. The observed 
BLT onset time at TC 1 was believed to have been Mach 19.6.  
 
 
Figure 21: Post-flight runway photograph of catalytic coating following STS-133. 
 
(a) (b)  
Figure 22: Pre- and post-flight comparison of STS-133 protuberance tile, (a) forward side 
of protuberance, (b) aft side of protuberance 
 
As with the previous flights, the engineering predictions for temperature were found to be 
higher than actual measurements. Predicted temperatures on the protuberance were 2870˚F 
(based on the STS-133 mission specific trajectory), as compared to the maximum-recorded 
temperature on the protuberance of 2288˚F. It is important to note however that the mission 
specific trajectory assumes that the protuberance transitioned at Mach 13.2, where the actual 
BLT onset was closer to Mach 8.3. The turbulent temperature at Mach 8.3 on the prediction was 
2310˚F, much closer to the measured flight temperature. Similar to the previous flights, the ability 
to compare predictions to actual flight data was less precise for the tiles surrounding the 
protuberance because of the sparseness of the instrumentation. Material experts have 
conclusively stated that the tile coating temperature did not exceed 2500˚F; however, it is 
believed that the temperatures were actually lower than 2500˚F. The maximum pre-flight 
prediction for the protuberance tile acreage was 2384˚F. The maximum measured temperature 
on the LI-900 tile acreage was 1991˚F as compared to the maximum predicted temperature of 
2216˚F (both of them corresponding to turbulent conditions). 
The predictions, including the certification case and the mission specific EOM cases, as well 
as the actual temperatures measured are shown in Table 3. It is important to note that the 
different sets of information each assume different boundary layer transition onset (for the 
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protuberance) and predictions assume earlier transition than was experienced. An important take 
away from the comparison is that all measured temperatures were below those predicted in the 
mission specific or certification trajectories. Those areas that did not have instrumentation did not 
show any signs that they would have exceeded the predicted temperatures.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of Prediction and Flight Temperatures for STS-133 
Material Peak Temperature (˚F) 
 ISSHVFW (Mach 14.6) 
Mission Specific 
(Mach 13.2) 
Actual  
(Trip Mach 8.3) 
Protuberance Laminar 2445 2376 2288 
Protuberance Turbulent 2944 2870 2064 
BRI-18 Laminar 2439 2384 <2500 
BRI-18 Turbulent 2533 2351 <2500 
LI-2200 Laminar 2413 2367 <2500 
LI-2200 Turbulent 2527 2319 <2500 
LI-900 Laminar 2166 2113 1960 
LI-900 Turbulent 2284 2216 1991 
RTV 472 444  
Aluminum 174 162  
 
Analysis in Support of Flight Experiments #5  
Prior to the STS-133 flight, and during the time in which the STS-133 flight was being 
approved for the 0.5” protuberance, a proposal to execute a scaled back version of the flight 
experiment (including the boundary layer trip and four thermocouples) was approved for STS-
134, to be flown on OV-105/Endeavour. It was decided that the protuberance would be the same 
height as STS-133, 0.5”, due to the rapid turnaround time required by the flight manifest as well 
as to allow the team to collect repeat data on a different vehicle. Included in the technical 
rationale for an additional flight was that addition of a fifth flight would allow the uncertainty in the 
mean conditions for BLT onset to approach a magnitude approximately equal to or less than the 
1-sigma prediction uncertainty. Because the same protuberance height would be flown on STS-
134 as STS-133, pre-flight analysis was much less involved and much of the STS-133 analysis 
was used for the STS-134 flight certification (the vehicles had very similar entry weights).  
 
Instrumentation Configuration for OV-105 
As previously stated, the fifth and final flight of the BLT FE was on OV-105 (Endeavour), 
representing the first flight on that vehicle. Each orbiter has a unique thermocouple layout and 
while OV-103 only had six thermocouples prior to the flight experiment additions, OV-105 had 
fourteen (Figure 23). Due to time constraints and limitations on available channels, only four 
additional thermocouples were added to the vehicle in preparation for the flight. It should be noted 
that OV-105 was already equipped with the “control” thermocouple on the port wing (V07T9666A) 
so it was not necessary to add additional instrumentation in that region to match OV-103. Key 
differences between STS-133 and STS-134 flight experiments include: 
 Two thermocouples are wired with a different configuration (S-turn), allowing the team to 
examine the effects of the wiring on the thermocouple anomaly. The belief is that the S-turn 
layout will decrease the cross-sectional area defined by the wire runs in the tile. Bench top 
evaluations of the antenna power of a typical thermocouple layout can decrease the radio 
frequency (RF) reception magnitude in the 1-3 GHz range by several decades. It is 
hypothesized that this change may reduce or eliminate the previously observed 
thermocouple anomaly if it is due to RF interactions. This belief is motivated by the 
perspective that the nominal wiring layout in a silica tile creates a geometric configuration 
much like a UHF antenna. A diagram of the protuberance and “Trip 2” (the S-turn) 
thermocouples is shown in Figure 24. 
 The thermocouples will be routed through the thermocouple reference junction (TRJ) and 
then a strain gage signal conditioner before going to the MADS pulse code modulation 
(PCM) unit. The control TC 9666 was already present on the vehicle and will be routed 
through the normal TRJ directly to MADS PCM only. This mitigation will attempt to reduce 
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the potential for external flow field effects causing a bias in the ground plane voltage that 
may affect the flight experiment thermocouple measurements. 
A diagram of the thermocouple locations is shown in Figure 25. Figure 26 shows pre-flight 
images for all thermocouples except for TC #1. The four thermocouples utilized for STS-134 are: 
 Trip #1: on the protuberance in the same location as on OV-103.  
 Trip #2: on protuberance tile but not on protuberance or in the vortex region and has the S-
turn layout. 
 TC #5: same location as on OV-103 and has the S-turn configuration as well as an 
exposed thermocouple junction.  
 TC #1: located in the same location as on OV-103 and has catalytic coating.  
 
 
Figure 23: Original Thermocouple 
Instrumentation on OV-105 (Endeavour) 
 
 
Figure 24: Nominal (Trip 1) and S-Turn (Trip 2) 
Thermocouple Configurations for STS-134. 
Similar geometric configuration has been 
implemented for TC #5 and TC Trip #2. 
 
 
Figure 25: BLT FE Instrumentation layout for OV-105 (Endeavour) 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 26: Pre-Flight Installation Images of Special Thermocouples Installed for OV-105. (a) Trip #1 
and Trip #2; (b) TC #5 
Trip #2 
Trip #1  TC #5 (with 
exposed 
junction 
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In addition to changes to the vehicle instrumentation, a series of the LI-900 tiles immediately 
downstream of the protuberance tile were replaced with LI-2200 tiles. Four tiles on OV-105 were 
replaced, an implementation analogous to that on OV-103 that is performed in order to have tiles 
immediately downstream of the protuberance which have a higher single use temperature capability. Just 
as with OV-103, the protuberance tile was fabricated out of BRI-18. A diagram of the tiles altered is 
shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27: Tile materials used in the vicinity of the protuberance tile for OV-105 
 
Conclusions and Summary 
In support of the Boundary Layer Transition Flight Experiment Project, a manufactured protuberance 
tile was installed on the port wing of Discovery and flown on STS-119, STS-128, STS-131 and STS-133 
as well as Endeavour for STS-134. Additional instrumentation was installed in order to obtain more 
spatially resolved measurements downstream of the protuberance. This instrumentation measured 
boundary layer transition and associated temperatures during flight. Comparisons of temperature 
predictions and the obtained flight data have shown that while BLT onset times have been accurately 
predicted using the engineering correlations, CFD based heating predictions are significantly higher than 
measured temperatures on the protuberance and in the region close to the protuberance. The reason for 
these discrepancies is currently unknown. Additionally, a thermocouple anomaly resulting in rapid or 
gradual shifting of temperatures has been observed for all of the BLT FE flights and seems to correlate to 
when the vehicle executes roll reversal maneuvers. This temperature measurement anomaly has made 
interpretation of the flight data difficult. Although the cause of the anomaly is unknown, steps have been 
taken on the fifth and final flight on STS-134, to mitigate the anomaly. Modified thermocouples were 
installed on Endeavor and an attempt will be made to alter the re-entry trajectory to offer more favorable 
conditions.  
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